IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, IN AND FOR PASCO COUNTY

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Plaintiff,

v. CASE NO.: CRC1400216CFAES

CURTIS JUDSON REEVES,

Defendant.

Spn 00683538

PROCEEDINGS: MOTION TO COMPEL

DATE: June 10, 2015

BEFORE: THE HONORABLE PAT SIRACUSA, JR.

Circuit Judge

Sixth Judicial Circuit New Port Richey, Florida

PLACE: West Pasco Judicial Center

7530 Little Road

New Port Richey, FL 34654

REPORTER: Victoria L. Campbell, RPR

Notary Public

State of Florida at Large

Administrative Office of the Courts
Court Reporting Department
West Pasco Judicial Center
7530 Little Road

New Port Richey, FL 34654

Telephone: (727) 847-8156 Fax: (727) 847-8159

APPEARANCES

APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA:

WILLIAM A. LOUGHERY, Assistant State Attorney Office of Bernie McCabe, State Attorney Sixth Judicial Circuit, Pinellas County

APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT, CURTIS JUDSON REEVES:

RICHARD ESCOBAR, Esquire DINO M. MICHAELS, Esquire Escobar & Associates 2917 W. Kennedy Boulevard Tampa, Fl 33609

APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE ESTATE OF CHAD OULSON:

TONY JOSEPH GRIMALDI, Esquire STEPHEN ANDREW LEAL, Esquire McIntyre Thanasides et al 501 E. Kennedy Boulevard Suite 1900 Tampa, Fl 33602-5238

1	PROCEEDINGS
2	THE COURT: All right. Oh, where's there
3	he is. There's Mr. Loughery. You need a moment to
4	get set up or are you ready?
5	MR. LOUGHERY: I'm ready.
6	THE COURT: Mr. Escobar, are you ready?
7	MR. ESCOBAR: I am ready.
8	THE COURT: All right.
9	MR. LOUGHERY: Judge, I think Mr. Grimaldi is
10	a party to this motion as well.
11	THE COURT: Okay.
12	MR. LOUGHERY: He's here is what I am saying.
13	THE COURT: If he wants desk room, he can have
14	desk room.
15	MR. LOUGHERY: Yeah. I don't know what he
16	wants to do.
17	THE COURT: Probation, surrender some desk
18	room to him.
19	Do you want it?
20	MR. GRIMALDI: No. I don't need it.
21	THE COURT: He doesn't need it. He doesn't
22	need the desk room.
23	MR. LOUGHERY: All right.
24	THE COURT: He doesn't need it. You don't
25	have to you can stay there, continuing to

1 lament that Ms. Neisham abandoned you. Let me see the file on Reeves. Just the first 2 3 one. I don't need all the volumes. All right. We're here in State of Florida versus Curtis Reeves. The case number is 5 6 2014-216CFAES. Allegation is murder in the second degree, a first-degree felony PBL, and aggravated 8 battery, a second-degree felony. 9 Present for the Defense are Mr. Escobar and 10 Mr. Michaels. 11 Present for the State is Mr. Loughery. 12 And the defendant is not present. His 13 presence was waived since this is purely legal 14 argument. 15 Mr. Grimaldi is present representing the 16 estate of Mr. Oulson. 17 All right. I have a motion and a request for 18 some discovery access. 19 Mr. Escobar, give it to me in a nutshell. 20 I'll have the State respond and then I'll have 21 Mr. Grimaldi add something, if he wishes to add 22 something. 23 What do you want? 24 MR. ESCOBAR: Your Honor, we are looking for 25 two things in our motion to compel. If the Court

1 recalls, very early on in this case we had made 2 some motions -- and I believe we've got an actual 3 order by the Court -- for the Court to preserve the contents of a cell phone --5 THE COURT: Yes. 6 MR. ESCOBAR: -- that was owned by Mr. Oulson 7 that was the subject of some testimony before this Court concerning Mr. Oulson making the remark that 8 9 he was texting his daughter and he was maybe 10 calling his daughter to determine how she was. 11 THE COURT: Okay. 12 Obviously that was testimony not MR. ESCOBAR: 13 only of the various witnesses, but I believe that 14 was the Government's position as well early on. 15 We have been asking for the download of that 16 particular phone and the ability to download that 17 phone for quite some time. 18 In April of this year, which is about a year 19 and four months or a year and three months after 20 this particular incident, --21 THE COURT: Yeah. 22 MR. ESCOBAR: -- we received the first 23 download from that cell phone. 24 I'm going to hand this to the Court. 25 Government's got that download. But I will hand

this to the Court so the Court can see what we received in the form of a download from that particular phone.

As you can see in reviewing that download, the information contained in that download, Your Honor, starts as early — if you look at the third page of that particular document that's titled, Message Recovered 6848 on January the 13th of 2014, you'll see that the download that was provided to us contains information as early as 8:11 in the morning, and it takes you all the way through — through 23:07 that same day, so about 11:07 that night.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ESCOBAR: So it comprises virtually the entire day. There are various sections of that download. The way these downloads are done, Your Honor, is that they use a forensic software called the Lantern Forensic Software.

There's going to be some indication by the Defense and some facts that we want to put on the record in camera concerning our findings of this Lantern report and why we believe that a download by our expert is absolutely necessary.

THE COURT: We're talking about an iPhone 5

here, right?

MR. ESCOBAR: We are.

THE COURT: Okay. And what is it that you don't have that you need out of it?

MR. ESCOBAR: Well, I need -- we need to do our own download of that particular phone because we believe that the download that was provided by -- that was done by the Sheriff's Office is clearly -- was done in error and provided us insufficient information concerning the activities that took place that particular day. We're prepared to show that to the Court. It's pretty easy to spot within the report the problems and the errors that were made, but we need the download being one thing.

The second thing that we need from that phone is the use of the phone so that we can conduct our own experiments, not download related, but things concerning lights and size and weight and how that particular light — how that particular phone appears within the same area of the theater, if you would.

And, so, I'd like to talk about -- first about the download and then we can talk about the second prong, which is the actual use of the phone.

THE COURT: Okav.

MR. ESCOBAR: As the Court well knowns -- and I've got a body of case law that I will provide to all parties.

As the Court well knows — and this is pretty basic right of privacy law. In Florida we do have a right of privacy that is given to us. It's actually a bit stricter than the federal right of privacy. And it's given to us by Article I, Section 23 of the Florida Constitution.

However, before someone can assert a right of privacy, that particular information first has to be proven to be private. You just can't say, "Well, I'm asserting my right of privacy" without discussing and proving that, in fact, the contents that you're seeking to be private is, in fact, private. It's that type of conduct that we would all expect to have a privacy interest in.

In looking at Mr. Grimaldi's motion — and that's the — that's the first step, Your Honor, that the Court has to take, keeping in mind that they've already waived it. Their right of privacy concerning this particular download is gone because what happened from the very beginning is that the State actually took custody of the phone. And then

after the State took custody of the phone,
Mr. Loughery approached Mrs. Oulson and said,
"Mrs. Oulson, you're the executor of Mr. Oulson's
estate and we would like permission to download
this particular phone." And she gave the State
permission to download that phone. And not
download just January the 13th, of 2014, because
you can't do that. When you download the phone,
you have to actually download the hard drive into a
mirrored image and then you can use the software in
an effort to select or filter the day that you want
to separate from the rest of the information.

So the minute that she's told Mr. Loughery —
because the only one that possibly — "possibly" I
say — could have an interest — a privacy interest
would be Mrs. Oulson. Now, our position is that
once you die, you lose your privacy interest under
the Florida Constitution.

And there's a case, Your Honor, that I will cite to the Court by the name of — and you've got it in your stack — Antico versus Sindt Trucking

Inc. That was a case where the Court said, "Hey, listen. We recognize that one of the parties there indicated that once you die, you lose your privacy interest. But we're deciding this case without

having to decide this issue" and so they did. They never decided the issue of whether death ceases your right of privacy under the Florida Constitution.

And so that issue is still ripe to be decided by any court that I'm aware of in Florida.

And so our position from the very beginning is that once Mr. Oulson died, there was no longer a right of privacy. Because when you read the Florida Constitution, it clearly gives you the indication that it's for a living person.

THE COURT: All right. Well, let's start with this: Do you need anything other than January 13th?

MR. ESCOBAR: No, Your Honor. And that's what we tried to do. We tried to tell them. We tried to tell them, "Hey, listen. Even though we believe that we're entitled to the entire phone, all the data of the phone, we're willing to be reasonable." We're not in a fishing expedition. We want to be able to have our expert download that particular day, that entire day, just like they did with the packet that they provided us, we want to download — our expert to download January the 13th.

1 The problem came --

And, Mr. Grimaldi, if I'm incorrect, please, you know, let me know.

When I spoke to Mr. Grimaldi, you know, one of the questions that we had — and Mr. Loughery was, you know, part of this conversation as well independently — was, "Well, you know, Rick, the way that, you know, you download the phone is by downloading the entire phone and then using the software in order to filter that January 13th date."

So I said, "Fine. There's no problems with that. My expert will download all of the contents of the phone, then use, you know, that filter in order to download or to preserve only the information on January the 13th. And I'll do it pursuant to a court order. My expert will do it pursuant to a court order. No problem."

They had a problem with that. They said, "Oh, no. You know, we can't download, you know, the information for the entire phone" when they've done it themselves.

And, so, that's where the impasse really came where we said, "Well, we're going to have to go to court" because there's no way for me to retrieve

the information I need to retrieve without 1 2 downloading the entire phone. 3 We have no problems with using the filter. And then after we use the filter and retrieve that 5 one day, giving them, you know, back the contents 6 of that full download because we don't need it 7 anymore. We're not -- this is not a fishing expedition; this is some concrete information that 8 9 I think we're entitled to. 10 THE COURT: All right. Well, hold on for a 11 second. Mr. Loughery, are you okay with that? 12 13 MR. LOUGHERY: No. And the reason why, Judge, 14 is --15 Tell me why not. THE COURT: 16 MR. LOUGHERY: -- and I think if we take it a 17 step further, if they're expert is allowed to 18 download the whole thing, --19 THE COURT: Right. 20 MR. LOUGHERY: -- then I would suggest from a

MR. LOUGHERY: -- then I would suggest from a public records point of view, anybody from the media could step up and say, "I want the whole download since you've discovered the whole download."

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24

25

THE COURT: Well, you're not discovering the

whole download. His expert's going to show up at the big fingerprint — or whatever we're calling that building — he's going to walk in with a computer; he's going to download the whole thing. He's going to extract one day; and then he's going to hit "delete", scrub his hard drive, show your expert that he did that, and then we're going to go from there. Right? I mean, can that work?

MR. LOUGHERY: Well, I suppose if it was as simple as that, which I don't know if it is or not.

THE COURT: I don't know. That's why -- I'm trying to cut through this Gordian knot, but it's a big knot.

MR. LOUGHERY: No. I understand, Judge. I'm just saying, if the Court orders that to happen, I would believe that under a public record request, from the standpoint that both sides — the State has now discovered the entire download. Now, maybe they didn't officially discover it like we call it, but they have been privy to this private information, whatever it might be, you'd be saying that Ms. Oulson's privacy rights don't apply or the state of the victims don't apply, and then if that argument was made, I would suggest we'd be putting ourselves in a slippery slope to some future

argument that the media or whoever is entitled to that same information. And I don't want to argue that. And I don't think it's necessary to get to that stage. Because this whole thing is predicated supposedly on the belief, although there's no evidence of that, that what we've given them is either incomplete or is in error. Okay?

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LOUGHERY: Now, so, I think it could resolve in a different way than having their expert be privy to the entire download and then deciding what he wants to filter out, even if somebody's present.

And, so, I just think it's a very dangerous area to get into when it doesn't need to be.

THE COURT: All right. Well, give me your position on how you resolve it and then I'll return to Mr. Escobar already in progress. I'm trying to see if we can cut through this though.

MR. LOUGHERY: Yeah. Well, I would say that it's been — until they can show, not in camera — okay? Because if they want to call some expert to say what we've given to them is in error and this is the reason why, and if the Court is satisfied that there's a true error that exists in the

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download that we did that would make some indication that we haven't given them everything that arguably they have a right to, which they may not even, but that's another relevance issue, then maybe at that point, we figure out some other way to do that.

But I would say we've taken our evidence -- as an officer of the court I'm telling you we aren't hiding anything. We've given them an entire day, which arguably there may be no relevance to any of this or there may be relevance for ten minutes of it. But to try to calm down and, you know, because if you think about how this ultimately is going to be used in discovery -- okay?

THE COURT: I have no idea.

MR. LOUGHERY: Okay. Well, assuming it's to impeach witnesses who said they heard Mr. Oulson say something. You know, "I'm calling my child's babysitter or school. I'm looking at the babysitter's — " whatever they think was supposedly said and then the phone doesn't show that. And I can tell the Court that it doesn't show that.

So if they want impeachment purposes, then that part's been perfected as far as they can say,

"Well, there's nothing on the website that says that."

Now, there's going to be an argument about what was actually said and what he was actually doing. Was he waiting for a phone call from — to see if his sick daughter had to be picked up so they had to leave the movie? Was he — any of those things. It's really kind of a grey area as to the relevance of it.

But if they suggest the relevance is to either show Mr. Oulson, if he made those statements, wasn't telling the truth or the eyewitness, the ear witnesses who said they heard that, that they must not have heard that because that's not what's on the phone and impeach them that way. They've already got that opportunity to do that. That's been perfected. That's there. So there's no real reason to go beyond that, especially under this speculation, as far as the Court's concerned, that we've left something out or it's been done in error.

So, you know, I would just say, at this point, you shouldn't be getting yourself and ordering the private property of a dead person to let the Defense just go through it and see what -- I think

it is a fishing expedition. 1 THE COURT: Okay. So you object to them 2 3 having their expert look at the one day? MR. LOUGHERY: Well, we've discovered that. 5 THE COURT: Okay. Well, I think he's saying 6 he wants to look at it himself, the phone. 7 want to look at that one day on the phone themselves in case you missed something. 8 9 MR. LOUGHERY: Yes. But the problem with that 10 is that you can't do that unless you look at 11 everything, unless the entire thing is downloaded. 12 THE COURT: But --13 MR. LOUGHERY: So then the Defense has had 14 access to an entire download. 15 THE COURT: All right. But let's say that --16 let's say -- on my computer, let's say I do a word 17 search for "Loughery". 18 MR. LOUGHERY: Okay. 19 THE COURT: And all the records that have 20 "Loughery" on it come up. 21 Uh-huh. MR. LOUGHERY: 22 THE COURT: And then I just put those on a 23 thumb drive, I've got everything with "Loughery" on 24 But I'm not discovering everything that's on 25 my computer that might say "Escobar" or "Michaels";

I'm just disclosing what says "Loughery" on it.

If you're just disclosing or giving them a chance to look at what says, "January 13th of 2014", how's that a problem?

MR. LOUGHERY: Right.

Well, I'm going to say it again. Okay? And this is the problem I see: I'm not saying it necessarily is unless a month from now there's a motion from some third party saying that what you've done has allowed us to get this. And I'm not so — we're not here to argue that today.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LOUGHERY: And I'm concerned that a month from now someone might say — or an appellate — the St. Pete — Tampa Bay Times may file a motion and you may deny it and they go appeal it and then suddenly somebody says, "Oh, no. You have to discover that whole thing." And then the media decides they're going to put everything on Mr. Oulson's phone they so chose to do out in the public's eye, which has no relevance, would only potentially affect a potential juror here, there's just no necessity for it —

THE COURT: How about this --

MR. LOUGHERY: -- considering we've discovered

1 to them the relevant aspect. 2 THE COURT: How about this: The packet that 3 Mr. Escobar's handed me -- I'm presuming he wants me to put this now in the court file; is that correct? 5 6 MR. ESCOBAR: Well, Your Honor, I do. 7 you know, we can take some precautions. I can tell 8 you --9 THE COURT: Well, I just wanted to confirm 10 that. So is what's in this prejudicial? Because 11 I've only had a moment to leaf through this, so I 12 can't say I know it. 13 MR. LOUGHERY: Well, I'm assuming it's 14 something we gave him in discovery. And if we gave 15 it to him in discovery, that's subject to public 16 records. 17 THE COURT: Okay. So there's no problem --18 It wouldn't normally be in a MR. LOUGHERY: 19 court file. So the media will have easier access 20 to it than doing a public record request, but it's 21 still subject to public records. 22 THE COURT: Okay. If it's already been done, 23 though, what's -- what's the difference whether his 24 expert looks at it or your expert looks at it? 25 MR. LOUGHERY: Okay.

THE COURT: Maybe I didn't follow it, so 1 2 explain to it me again. 3 MR. LOUGHERY: The whole problem is that the expert has to download the entire phone, every day, not just the day that we've discovered. 5 6 THE COURT: Okay. 7 MR. LOUGHERY: Not just the day that is 8 arguably the relevant day. 9 THE COURT: Okav. 10 MR. LOUGHERY: Because they don't want to go 11 on a fishing expedition, supposedly. There's no 12 way to just say, "Give me this day." They've got 13 to download the whole thing first. 14 THE COURT: Onto the computer. 15 MR. LOUGHERY: Okay. 16 THE COURT: And then hit "search". 17 MR. LOUGHERY: I understand. 18 THE COURT: And then just take those --19 MR. LOUGHERY: Okay. Here's my point, 20 again -- all right? -- is I'm not clear and I 21 don't think the Court can be clear, especially when 22 it's unnecessary, especially when you've got to 23 show me some prejudice first that we haven't abided 24 by the discovery rules, which we certainly have. 25 THE COURT: Well, I'll get to that in a

minute.

MR. LOUGHERY: Okay.

THE COURT: I just want to -- I just want to find out if I let the camel's nose in the tent, how far does the camel go. That's what I'm trying to figure out.

MR. LOUGHERY: Well, the point is, I'm not the camel.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LOUGHERY: Okay? And I'm concerned there's a camel out there. Okay? There's plenty of camels sitting out in the benches today that maybe — you know. So who knows what they may decide or their lawyers may decide because this has become — speaking of "camels" are found in the circus and this is getting to be more and more of that as far as the media is concerned. No.

THE COURT: There isn't even a camera here today. We're getting better.

MR. LOUGHERY: Yeah. I noticed. Or boring. Yeah, more boring, I suppose.

So my point is, I'm not sure -- I haven't done the research, nor do I think I need to at this stage since I've abided by discovery, to get into what could be the problems by you allowing a

1 defense expert to download the whole thing. 2 that, therefore, burden the public records arena 3 and have we compromised it in that regard? THE COURT: No. 5 All right. Now I understand what you're 6 saying. How about this, though: If your expert 7 already downloaded the whole thing to extract this one day --8 9 MR. LOUGHERY: Yes . 10 THE COURT: -- didn't somebody already 11 download the whole thing? 12 MR. LOUGHERY: Yes. But we didn't discover 13 that. All we discovered was the only one day, the 14 only one relevant day. 15 THE COURT: But if his expert goes in, looks 16 at the computer or looks at the phone, downloads it 17 all onto one computer sitting right there --18 MR. LOUGHERY: I know what you're saying. 19 THE COURT: -- only gets that one day, then he 20 doesn't get -- Mr. Escobar and Mr. Michaels never 21 get to look at anything other than that one day, 22 I'm still limiting the parameters to the same exact 23 parameters you've already given them. 24 MR. LOUGHERY: No. I understand. And I'm not 25 saying -- you're asking my opinion about what I

think you should do here. Okay? 1 THE COURT: Right. Yeah. 2 3 I understand what you're MR. LOUGHERY: 4 saying, but I'm concerned. I think being cautious about a problem that could exist, we shouldn't go 5 6 that route when there's no real reason to do that. 7 THE COURT: All right. 8 MR. LOUGHERY: They have yet to show any 9 prejudice or any error that's occurred. 10 THE COURT: All right. MR. LOUGHERY: So there's no -- nothing out 11 12 there to say that we have not discovered what we 13 were supposed to do. 14 THE COURT: All right. I'll ask him about 15 that next. I was going to go there next. I wanted 16 to see if I could shortcut it and get it fixed. 17 MR. LOUGHERY: I don't know. 18 THE COURT: Mr. Grimaldi, do you want to add 19 something at this point? 20 MR. GRIMALDI: Yes, Your Honor. 21 THE COURT: I'm going to come to you at the end. Let me see if I can fix this first. 22 23 come to you at the end. All right? 24 It's just on this specific MR. GRIMALDI: 25 issue. That's why I --

THE COURT: All right. What is it on this specific issue? What do you want to tell me?

MR. GRIMALDI: Well, this specific issue being that while, as the State argued as far as what is relevant and what is not, and the Defense indicated that had Nicole may have already waived those -- her privacy --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. GRIMALDI: -- because it's Chad's phone, because he is now deceased or whether she allowed the State to download the phone. First of all, we haven't established whether the phone is actually Chad's or if the phone is actually Nicole's; if the bill was in Nicole's name or the bill was in Chad's name. So I believe their Antico case is not relevant yet.

THE COURT: Well, I'm not worried about any of that yet. I'm trying to see if I even need to disarm this device. I might have already figured this out.

MR. GRIMALDI: But my other issue is that with her -- she obviously does not understand how a phone, like an expert does, needs to be downloaded. And when she provided a limited waiver of her privacy to look at the phone, she understood it to

be the time frame that is relevant, not even the entire day, the time frame that is relevant, meaning, maybe the time that they actually showed up at the theater to the time maybe even ten minutes after he got shot. Because what if Chad was doing things that are private that affect other people on that phone earlier that morning? That stuff is completely irrelevant. It has nothing to do with even the questions the Defense could possibly raise in the future.

THE COURT: I understand. But we're already past one day. We already have one day. I've got one day right here. So that's already out. I can't undo this. This is already out.

MR. GRIMALDI: Right.

THE COURT: So let me see why he believes there's a mistake made. Maybe there isn't even a mistake made yet.

Mr. Escobar, tell me what mistake do you think the State has made in providing you all these records?

MR. ESCOBAR: Judge, I'll be glad in camera to show that to you line by line of the mistake. It's an issue that we've discovered. It's our work product. And I'll be more than glad to put that on

the record. We could seal it and let the appellate courts at some point in time review it. But it's pretty clear by looking at the actual records that there's a big mistake that was made. Huge mistake.

THE COURT: Why's it got to be -- why's it got to be a secret? If your expert's going to examine this stuff, you're going to tell the State anyway, right?

MR. ESCOBAR: Because, Judge, I don't believe that it's our obligation at this point in time to divulge that to the Government.

I think at this point in time, we've got our experts, we've done our work product, it should be preserved until the time that we decide at this point in time to turn over that information.

THE COURT: Well, that time is fast approaching. That time is fast approaching.

MR. ESCOBAR: I realize.

THE COURT: Believe me, you're going to get an order on Friday that's going to explain that the Court is now been waiting for a long time. We're approaching 18 months now that I've been waiting for discovery to be completed. And discovery, both of you have an obligation. You haven't discovered anything to him yet. Right?

1 MR. ESCOBAR: You know when we got this?
2 THE COURT: I don't know.
3 MR. ESCOBAR: April the 9th of 2015.

THE COURT: Then welcome to my road of frustration. I've been frustrated at discovery for a while now. I get it.

MR. ESCOBAR: You can't -- I know you're looking at us and saying, "Well, you know, you haven't provided, you haven't provided." When I get the most important part that we asked about at the beginning -- at the bond hearing about the phone and we get it on April the 18th, and this case happened in January the 13th of 2014, Your Honor, it's not the Defense. I know what they want us to do. They want us to try to do the discovery or the depositions without getting all the proper discovery that we need in order to zealously and competently question these witnesses and we can't do that in representing our client competently.

So we get this April the 9th. The minute that we get it April the 9th, it goes to our experts.

We start examining it.

And at this point in time, Your Honor, I will tell you the first thing: First of all,

Mr. Loughery -- and there's case law in the packet

that I gave to you --

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. ESCOBAR: -- Mr. Loughery has no standing whatsoever to argue about third-party privacy interests. The only one that may have an interest at this point, because she the executor of Mr. Oulson's estate, would be Mrs. Oulson, and we refute that as well.

We believe that the minute that two things happen: Number one, with the death of Mr. Oulson, the privacy rights have vanished. Number two, even beyond that, the time that Mr. Loughery had a conversation with Mrs. Oulson where she said, "Yeah. Here you go. You can go ahead and download that phone", she has relinquished, not only for herself but also for Mr. Oulson as his personal representative, all of the privacy rights in that phone.

We're not trying to be unreasonable. We're not trying to do a search of the entire phone. We want one day. And, so, in my conversation with Mr. Grimaldi, I said, "Look. Our expert would download it" just like the State expert. I can tell you the State expert is no more credible, no more honest, no more truthful than my expert.

<u>-</u>

Their expert did that. They were able to extract that one day. They were able to isolate that one day and then they provided me that one day.

Mr. Loughery is standing up talking about speculation of whether the St. Pete Times or the Tampa Times and the Tampa Tribune are going to get involved. That's pure speculation. At this point in time there's an obligation and a burden on one person, that's Mr. Grimaldi and his client to bring before this Court, first of all, the issue of number one, are the contents of this phone of the type that one can expect should be private.

Because that's what they have to prove. It's their burden. That's what they have to prove.

And then if, in fact, it's of the type that, in fact, garners under Article I, Section 23, the right of privacy, then the Court starts applying this issue of balancing test and waiver.

I'm going to give the Court another piece of information. Florida Statutes 90.507. I believe it's the first statute in the packet that I've provided you.

Let me read to you what 90.507 says.

"A person who has a privilege against disclosure -- against the disclosure of

1 confidential matters or communication waives the 2 privilege if the person or the person's predecessor 3 while the holder of the privilege voluntarily -voluntarily -- discloses or makes the communication when he or she does not have a reasonable 5 6 expectation of privacy, or -- " 7 This is the important part. 8 " -- consents to the disclosure of any 9 significant part of the matter or communication." 10 So we've got a statute. Not only a common law 11 waiver, but we've got a statute that speaks 12 directly to what happened between Mr. Loughery and 13 Mrs. Oulson, and that is, she said, "Go ahead. 14 Download it. Use it for your case. Do whatever 15 you need to do with it." And that's what they did. 16 THE COURT: How do we know that Mr. Loughery 17 and Ms. Oulson had this conversation? 18 MR. ESCOBAR: Mr. Loughery told me. 19 THE COURT: Okay. But Ms. Oulson's not here 20 to tell me that she --Well, is she here? 21 22 MR. ESCOBAR: Judge, I don't believe that 23 Mr. Loughery will tell you anything different 24 because that's what he told me. 25 THE COURT: No.

I'm not saying that he didn't. I'm telling 1 you -- you say it as though I know it. 2 I'm not 3 omniscient. That would make this job much easier. I'm not. MR. ESCOBAR: I believe I had that same 5 6 conversation with Mr. Grimaldi where he 7 acknowledged that. 8 THE COURT: Again, I don't know. But you're 9 telling me things as though it's as true as the sun 10 will rise tomorrow. I believe you, but I don't 11 have any facts or testimony to it yet and, so, I 12 don't know what she's consented to or what she 13 hasn't consented to. 14 MR. ESCOBAR: It's their burden. They first 15 have to show that it's a private communication. 16 They have to show that the type of communication, 17 the words, the whatever, is intended to be private. 18 That's how it all starts. That's under -- now I'll 19 give you the case. 20 THE COURT: Well, these are texts between 21 people and their Facebook postings that he's 22 looking at, private communications between himself 23 and others. And there's --24 MR. ESCOBAR: They're not.

THE COURT: I have to sign warrants now all

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the time to get people's cell phones when they raid 1 drug dealers' houses so that they can look in those 2 3 I'm sure that if your client was charged phones. with possession of drugs and Mr. Loughery was going 5 through his phone without a warrant, you'd have a 6 problem with that, right? 7 MR. ESCOBAR: Facebook, texts, those matters 8 are not private. I'll cite to you --9 THE COURT: Texts aren't private? 10 MR. ESCOBAR: No. -- Nucci versus Target 11 Corporation, which is a January 2015 case. 12 going to read to you what it is says. You've got 13 it in your packet there, Your Honor. THE COURT: Which packet are we talking about 14 15 here? 16 MR. ESCOBAR: The one that has the large 17 paperclip. 18 THE COURT: Okay. Again, I lack omniscience, 19 so I'm not sure where it is in this giant stack 20 of --21 MR. ESCOBAR: I've got another one. 22 May I approach? 23 THE COURT: No. Wait a minute now. 24 that people don't think I'm not paying attention 25 here, it's not in here.

MR. ESCOBAR: Here's another packet 1 2 (indicating). 3 THE COURT: Another packet. Okay. All right. This packet's different. has case law. Let's see. 5 6 All right. Which one am I looking at? 7 MR. ESCOBAR: The case is Nucci versus Target 8 Corp. 9 THE COURT: How many cases down is it; do you 10 know approximately? 11 MR. GRIMALDI: Six, Your Honor. 12 THE COURT: Six. All right. Thank you. 13 MR. ESCOBAR: And I'll read you just some of 14 the -- some of the language of this case. 15 "We agree with those cases concluding that, 16 generally, photographs posted on social networking 17 sites are neither privileged nor protected by any 18 right of privacy, regardless of any privacy 19 settings that the user may have established." 20 And they go on to cite a case also of 21 Patterson vs. Turner. And it says: 22 Holding that: "The postings on the 23 plaintiff's online Facebook account, if relevant, 24 are not shielded from discovery merely because the 25 plaintiff used the service's privacy settings to

restrict access. Such posted photographs are unlike medical records or communications with one's attorney where disclosure is confined to narrow, confidential relationships. Facebook itself does not guarantee privacy. By creating a Facebook account, a user acknowledges that her personal information would be shared with others. Indeed, that is the very nature and purpose of these social network sites else they would cease to exist.

Because the information that an individual shares through a social network web-sites like Facebook may be copied and disseminated by another, the expectation of such information is privacy in traditional sense of the word, is not a reasonable one.

Legitimate expectations of privacy may be even lower in e-mails or other Internet transmissions."

And they cite <u>United States vs. Lifshitz</u> at 369 F.2d 173 (sic).

And that's contrasting the privacy expectation of e-mail within greater expectation of materials located on a personal computer.

So, no, these -- and if you look at the exhibit, which is the download, there is a great deal of Facebook images all throughout. In fact,

the vast majority of what's not a dictionary in the packet that was provided to me on the download are Facebook postings. I mean, there's Facebook posting after Facebook posting after Facebook posting. And so the vast majority of what's here, in my opinion, is not private and, therefore, they've got the burden, first of all, to be able to show this Court that, wait a minute; what's being disseminated to the Defense here is the type of communication that our Constitution expects to be private; therefore, I've an got an interest, a standing in order to object. They've never done that. It's their burden; it's not mine.

And Mr. Loughery has absolutely no standing.

And I can cite, you know, many cases in the packet that I gave you that stands for that proposition.

He doesn't have the standing to object. I think that —

And I'm going to give you this case now because you mentioned something, Your Honor, that there's a case that actually outlined that procedure. The case of Antico vs. Sindt Trucking Incorporated, which is at 148 So.2d 163 (sic).

It's in your packet. It's a 2014 case.

THE COURT: Okay. How many down so I don't

have to --

MR. GRIMALDI: It's the third one in, Judge.

THE COURT: The third one in? Thank you.

MR. GRIMALDI: Third or fourth.

MR. ESCOBAR: If you look at that case, Your
Honor -- and I will tell you that this case is
distinguishable in my favor. But the court here -and I believe it was a First District Court of
Appeal case. What they did was exactly what the
Court was proposing to do. They said, "Wait a
minute. We're going to fashion certain
restrictions on how the party is going to be able
to download and extract the information that they
want."

And if you look on page -- I think it's the third page of that opinion. It goes through a list of seven things that the Court determined were appropriate in order to balance the interest of the parties in getting the needed material. In one of them they said to:

"Install write-protected software to ensure no alteration of the phone's hard drive would be made during the inspection.

Number two: Download a copy of the cell phone's hard drive, making a master copy, a review

copy, and a copy for Petitioner's counsel.

Number three: Return the cell phone to the Petitioner's counsel immediately after copying the hard drive.

Four: Review only the data on the hard drive for the nine-hour period permitted by the Court, including call records, text messages, web searches, emails ... and received, uploads, downloads, data changes and GPS data.

Number five: Prepare a summary of the data reviewed, including the type of data, use of data date and time of the data, and any other information he or she deems relevant.

Number six: Provide the summary to the Petitioner's counsel prior to the dissemination of any more specifics findings. Petitioner's counsel should have ten days from service to file a Motion for Protective Order or other form of objection to the release of all or a portion of the data, citing grounds for each objection.

Number seven: If no objection is interposed by the Petitioner, then Respondent's expert may release his or her findings to the Respondents' counsel."

So ... I mean, I'm not suggesting that this is

what you have to do here because I don't believe they've met their burden. But I think this Court in the First District was opining, as you were, that there are ways in order to protect the interests of everybody by doing it in a very protective rule mandated manner.

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But, again, Judge, I think we're really, you know, jumping far ahead afield at this point in time because it is their obligation, their burden under 3.220 -- the protective order, (1) and (m) -it is their burden to show that, number one, it's a communication that deserves the right of privacy protected by Article I, Section 23. And then, you know, obviously, you know, the balancing test that we have to apply, you know, once that's done. that's not even considering the fact that it's been waived. That ship has sailed. They had the right to say to Mr. Loughery, "I do not want you to download any of the information on that phone." They chose not to do that. They chose to allow Mr. Loughery to do that and so that's over.

And, Judge, just so that we can have a record here of the cases, the statute that I cited on waiver is 90.507. We will also cite Alterra

Healthcare versus the Estate of Shelley, which is

located at 827 So.2d 936; Post-Newsweek Stations 1 versus Doe, located at 612 So.2d 549; Holland vs. Barfield, which is located at 35 So.2d 953 (sic); Post-News Stations vs. Florida vs. Doe, located at 612 So.2d 549; Antico, which I just cited to the 6 Court; Winfield, which is one of the first cases to really deal with this issue in Florida, which is located at 477 So.2d 544; the Nucci case, which 8 I've already cited to the Court; Menke vs. Broward 9 10 County School Board, and that one is located at 916 11 So.2d 8; Times Publishing vs. the State, 903 So.2d 12 322; Dwyer versus State, 743 So.2d 46; Banks versus 13 State, 351 So.2d 1071; and Savage versus State, 99 14 So.3d 1001. 15

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These are all cases standing for that same proposition of how we need to proceed orderly with a motion like this and it's their burden initially, which they have not met.

THE COURT: All right. Give me a moment. Ι want to read something.

All right. Mr. Escobar, if I were writing the order -- I'm sorry. If you were writing the order, tell me what you would put in the order and why you would put it that way, simply.

MR. ESCOBAR: Your Honor, what I would put in

the order would be that we be allowed to have our expert to come down to the, I would presume, the Sheriff's Office --

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. ESCOBAR: — to allow the download of that particular phone; for that expert then to use software in order to filter or extract all of the information that took place on January the 13th of 2014. Once that information was preserved by the expert, that the expert would then turn over the downloaded hard drive of the phone back to the Government or some representative of the Government, and we would go on our way with our download to do our further analysis.

THE COURT: Do you have any objection to the Government's expert watching your expert during the download?

MR. ESCOBAR: No objection.

THE COURT: What's missing from the download that you say the State has not given you? Because if you're telling me that they didn't give you something, tell me what it is they didn't give you.

MR. ESCOBAR: Your Honor, I'd prefer to do that in camera. I think that it's of a sensitive nature enough. And I think when you see what the

verbiage is, I think this Court would prefer me to do it in camera. And we would certainly prefer it because it's part of our work product. It's part of the packet that they provided me. It's not something that I put into to this packet. But it's clearly visible once you examine it and you know what you're doing in reference to the Lantern Forensic Software Report.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Loughery, do you object to me doing this in camera?

MR. LOUGHERY: Yeah. On this last point, I do, Judge. I'll tell you why: I object to it under reciprocal discovery.

They've already had an expert that looked at this, who's a person that apparently exists, who has looked at the discovery and has said the State has made a mistake. Therefore, that person has information that I imagine is going to have to be released to the State at some point. And if they've had that more than 15 days, then they should have given it to us already.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. LOUGHERY: Okay? Because -- and, so, I've got a problem with that.

Let me go back just a second just so we're on

1 the same page here. This motion wanted the cell phone for a week 2 3 unsupervised. That's how we started in here this morning. 5 THE COURT: Okay. 6 MR. LOUGHERY: That's what his motion asks 7 for. 8 THE COURT: All right. He's refined what he's 9 requesting. 10 MR. LOUGHERY: Well, no, you've refined it 11 and, apparently, he's agreed to it now. THE COURT: Well, --12 13 No, Your Honor. That's part MR. ESCOBAR: 14 two. Part two is us getting the phone. 15 way of us getting the phone without us getting the 16 phone and the hard drive. There's a way of doing 17 that. 18 THE COURT: All right. Well, let's just 19 finish this part. 20 MR. LOUGHERY: Okay. 21 THE COURT: Mr. Escobar, whatever you need to 22 tell me, you're going to have to tell me in here. 23 I'm not going to do this one in camera. So what do 24 you want to tell me? 25 MR. ESCOBAR: Judge, if you look at the

1 report. And I am going to show you there's a place called "dictionary". 2 3 THE COURT: Okay. MR. ESCOBAR: And I want to you take a look at 5 the dictionary. And I'll tell you how many pages 6 of the dictionary are completely in error. 7 THE COURT: Okay. Are there numbers on this? I don't see any numbers on this. Let me take this 8 9 off. 10 MR. ESCOBAR: Up until the middle of -- let me 11 double check to make sure for the record that we 12 have it correct. 13 It's all the way up to entry number, Your 14 Honor, 641. You see the entry number is that 15 second column? 16 THE COURT: Yep. Now I've got it. All right. 17 641, let's see what I've got. 18 MR. ESCOBAR: Now, if you look at first page 19 of that document, it's called "dictionary". What 20 the Apple Software does is that it actually 21 categorizes the words that are used by the user of 22 this phone --23 THE COURT: Okay. 24 MR. ESCOBAR: -- and it categorizes them. And 25 it categorizes them in alphabetical order.

1 THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ESCOBAR: You will see that there was either two things that could have happened here. Number one, the individual that downloaded and filtered this particular information downloaded it and filtered it incorrectly. Or, number two, there was an Apple Software issue that was not corrected before the download was actually done. And this is the reason why:

When you start looking from 642 on, you will see that it's a dictionary and it's alphabetized all the way through without any problems whatsoever.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ESCOBAR: But when you see the first number of pages, 14 pages, whatever it is, you will see it's actually text messages, text messages that have no date and text messages that have no time.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ESCOBAR: And I'd probably prefer not to read some of these text messages, Your Honor, because of the sensitivity of them.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ESCOBAR: But ...

THE COURT: You'd prefer not to read them, but

you're putting them in evidence in the court file.

MR. ESCOBAR: Well, I have to. I have no choice --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ESCOBAR: -- because I've got to make a record. It's as simple as that. I would have loved to have done this in camera, but I've got to make a record.

And, so, I can tell you that the -- we believe that the last e-mail -- because it should go through the last e-mail being on the top -- we believe that the last text message, not an e-mail -- the last text messages was something to the effect of, "Cleaned for a good pounding."

And, so, the time, the dates of these particular text messages, which were not reflected in the areas that — they're supposed to be reflected in the report. If you look at the report, there are segments of the report that are specifically delineated for the capture and the recording and the downloading of text messages. And in here what happened was is that those particular text messages, we believe, were actually downloaded into the dictionary.

And if you read all the way down through all

these pages, you will see that there are a series of texts, one after another, one after another, one after another. Obviously some of these texts are very important in our defense, especially the very last one, obviously. We want to know what time that statement was made, "Cleaned for a good pounding." That is something that is going to be extremely important.

In addition to that, we want to know whether if, in fact, they made an error concerning the texting and the download there, we believe that we have the same error in the Facebook chronology.

And when you look at the Facebook chronology,
Your Honor, it appears that there's a Facebook
chronology, but there is actually no text, no
information. It's just the Facebook download image
that's coming down.

And so we need our expert to download it appropriately. My expert's a former FBI expert that dealt for, I believe — I think it was like 14 years he dealt in Miami with this particular area. And you could put him on whatever orders the Court wants to put him on to restrict him as to what he's able to do. And if you want, you can have the State's expert looking over his shoulder. We have

no problems, but we certainly need the information in order to confront the evidence that the Government has placed in front of us to tell us, "Hey, you know, yeah, he didn't text his daughter and, you know, yeah, he didn't call his daughter and that's about all you should do, Rick. Don't worry about it. You know, that's enough for you."

No. It's not enough for us. We want to know exactly what was taking place during that time; we want to know what communication he was having with whom. And that's critical to our case in chief.

THE COURT: What time did the shooting allegedly happen?

MR. ESCOBAR: Somewhere between 1:10 to 1:30, 1:40, depending upon, you know, which witness you --

THE COURT: Okay. Somewhere around after 1:00 but before 1:40.

MR. ESCOBAR: Again, Your Honor, we still maintain that Mr. Grimaldi, nor the State — and they don't even have standing to assert this. They haven't brought Ms. Oulson up here to say, "Hey, listen. You know, what's on that phone is really private — is really private information. Let me tell you, you know, generally what it is so that

you can assess the privacy interest that's afforded to me under Article I, Section 23." They haven't done any of that and that's their burden. It's not our burden.

THE COURT: I understand. I'm just trying to figure out what we have here.

MR. LOUGHERY: I don't mean to interrupt,

Judge, but I have something before you --

THE COURT: What have you got?

MR. LOUGHERY: Well, a couple things we need to not lose track of here. Okay?

I believe we do have standing because this is ultimately under the Rules of Discovery. Okay? And under the Rules of Discovery, that has to at least lead to relevant information. And, so, you know, if we can't — if we're just talking about — I mean, I don't know, you know, when Mr. Escobar says, this dictionary thing is wrong and that, we haven't heard any evidence of that. I don't know that. And, of course, you know, if they were to take the deposition of the person who supposedly erroneously did it from the State and he had an opportunity to answer their questions, which might clarify the issue that we have no evidence in front of the Court right now there's an error, then,

perhaps, they can come in front of the State and
say, "Look. The State's witness admittedly didn't
do this correct." But they haven't done that.
It's just this magical work product thing that's
been hanging out here for 18 months.
Okay. Then after they show that expert -- I
don't care who the expert is. I mean, it's not
like we want a head start in looking up the CV. I

don't care who the expert is. I mean, it's not like we want a head start in looking up the CV. I don't care about that. But there has to be some evidence in front of the Court to back up what they're suggesting. And they're doing this in a vacuum by saying, "We don't want to ask anybody who might have the answers; we want to do all of this stuff before we have to do that."

THE COURT: All right.

MR. LOUGHERY: And I don't see what the prejudice is. So ...

THE COURT: If you were writing the order, what would you write in the order?

MR. LOUGHERY: If I was writing the order, I would write the order that it would be denied. It would be very simple. Just say that. Okay?

THE COURT: Okay. Let's say that I was entertaining the idea of giving Mr. Escobar's expert some access to the phone, which obviously I

am, what would the reasonable limitations you would
write in the order be?

MR. LOUGHERY: Well, I mean, I'm sure just --

I don't know if there's any limitations beyond the ones they've already said, which is they just want that same amount we've already provided to them.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LOUGHERY: But just because we provided -THE COURT: What's the problem with them
looking it up again then?

MR. LOUGHERY: No. I understand. I've already said what my problem with that is.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LOUGHERY: Okay? But I think it potentially creates a public records issue that I don't see the necessity of having to do that right now until we've determined there really is something that's amiss, either by them deposing the person or having this witness come in and testify to the Court specifically why it is this is an error. And, perhaps, I could cross-examine him to determine that it's not necessarily an error. I don't know. We're just talking about a mystery here.

THE COURT: Well, let's look at it this way,

Say it was a gun, not some new piece of 1 though: information or new piece of technology that always 2 3 gives us trouble, but, rather, something we've had around for a long time. MR. LOUGHERY: 5 Yes. 6 THE COURT: Let's say that it was a gun and --7 MR. LOUGHERY: Yes. 8 THE COURT: -- your expert fires three of the bullets and there are six bullets left and his 9 10 expert wants to fire three of the bullets --11 MR. LOUGHERY: Of course. 12 THE COURT: -- you'd let him. 13 MR. LOUGHERY: Of course. 14 THE COURT: Your expert got to turn on the 15 phone and look at that day; why can't his expert 16 turn on the phone and look at that day? 17 MR. LOUGHERY: Well, because, first off, I 18 don't think there's a privacy issue with a qun, 19 number one. And, number two, there has to be some 20 relevance to what they're looking for. This is 21 governed by discovery, not some civil case. 22 criminal discovery. 23 And, so, in theory, look, if, in fact, the 24 person who created the discovery, you know, our quy

who went through the phone, if he made a mistake,

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my gosh, I'd love to find out what it is and I'd like to correct that. I certainly don't want to give them bad information or information that that's bad. So, in that regard, the aspect of going — but I don't know that we've established that yet.

THE COURT: All right.

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MR. LOUGHERY: And going through the way you suggested before with the expert standing there watching him doing it, that the only thing -- the software apparently, if true, you can filter it and just show me that one day, and we don't have any evidence of that, you can download everything in the dark and then just turn a light on that last day. Okay? If that can truly be done -- I don't know. We haven't heard any testimony about it. I'd hate to find out that we're wrong about that. And then if, in fact, that person can do that, and whatever he then downloads, we get a copy of that as well, we don't have to wait until they filter it and decide on what they want to rediscover to us -okay? -- then I suppose I would write the order in that fashion. And then -- and, perhaps, you'd have to do a protective order afterwards saying that the rest of this is clearly not part of discovery,

maybe that would nip in the bud future arguments from third parties.

But, you know, if you look at the Rules of Discovery, not to throw a rachet in here, but you know, we have to give them information we intend to use at a hearing or trial. I don't know if we intend to use — those aren't relevant, those text messages or the stuff we gave them. I mean, if they're in error and there is some relevance of it, then they would intend to use it in trial and they would have it, but I don't see where we're obligated to go through this whole phone.

We have no intention to use any of this stuff — anything in the phone. That was just given to them under discovery because I'm sure if they had done a motion, the Court would have said there's some relevance to see what's on his cell phone right before this happened. And, so, we gave that to them without having the Court order to do that. And, so, you know, I — you know.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LOUGHERY: I just think we haven't established -- especially when you're messing with the privacy of a victim here. Okay? And his entire cell phone and that we're going to

1 potentially push that out there to have people pry 2 into, I think we should be very, very cautious. 3 And I don't know if we have any kind of record to establish half the stuff you even said. We haven't heard any expert testimony to say why this is wrong 5 6 and the State needs to give us more information 7 about that. 8 THE COURT: Okay. 9 MR. ESCOBAR: Judge, if I may? I'm not sure 10 if Mr. Loughery really meant what he just said. 11 I'm going to read to you --12 THE COURT: I presume that Mr. Loughery means 13 everything he says. 14 MR. LOUGHERY: Well, unless I said it wrong. 15 MR. ESCOBAR: 3.220(b)(1)(F). 16 THE COURT: Okay. 17 MR. ESCOBAR: "The prosecution shall serve a 18 written discovery exhibit which shall disclose to 19 the defendant, permit the defendant to inspect, 20 copy, test, photograph the following information 21 and material within the State's possession or control ... " 22 23 THE COURT: Right. 24 MR. ESCOBAR: " ... any tangible papers or 25 objects that were obtained or belonged to from the

defendant as well as from other people." There's 1 two sections of this. 2 3 I'm talking about the one, MR. LOUGHERY: No. objects not obtained from him. Objects not The ones that we intend to use in trial. 5 obtained. 6 That's what that rule says. 7 THE COURT: Okay. 8 MR. ESCOBAR: Judge, this is the problem 9 procedurally: In my opinion, procedurally they 10 have not met their burden. And we're already 11 getting to the nuts and bolts of the argument when 12 procedurally no one's come up here. They haven't 13 brought -- Ms. Oulson's not even here. 14 haven't brought Oulson in here to even say, "Hey. 15 You know what? Those things are private. 16 You know what? I'm the personal representative." 17 I'm taking that word from Mr. Loughery and --18 MR. LOUGHERY: There was a written response 19 from Mr. Grimaldi in the case. 20 MR. ESCOBAR: -- and Mr. Grimaldi. 21 THE COURT: I read it. 22 MR. ESCOBAR: And, so, you know, they've got 23 to be able to show that burden. They've got to 24 show that, number one, the communication that

they're seeking to protect, it's one that there's

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an expectation -- a general expectation of privacy from the public. They haven't done that.

I'm trying to be as reasonable as I can and not go on a fishing expedition. I have no interest in doing that. But I have an interest in taking a look at those particular areas, that one day, that I think is going to be very beneficial to the Defense once we clear up the errors that were done in the download by the State. They've done it.

Think about the issue of fairness. Think just — just fairness. How can it be fair for the State of Florida who accuses someone of second-degree murder and to say, "You know what, I've got the phone because she allowed me to have the phone. You know what, I downloaded the entire phone and, you know, after I downloaded the phone, I only gave you what I wanted to give you, which was January the 13th. And you know what, you're stuck with it because you have not right to confront it."

MR. LOUGHERY: Because that's -- wait a minute. That's the only relevant aspect.

THE COURT: Wait. Hold on. I'm going to ask him that question.

Why would you need anything other than that

day?

MR. ESCOBAR: I'm not asking for anything.

But what I'm saying is -- and I think that under

the law, I think we're entitled to everything, but
I don't what that; I just want that day.

THE COURT: Well, let me clear it up. You're not entitled to everything. You would not get his whole phone. I would never have that happen.

MR. ESCOBAR: Okay.

THE COURT: If I'm mistaken about that, I'm in the wrong job because I am not going to start handing out people's cell phones for people to peruse through every piece of data that's in their phone. That's never going to happen and I would resign before I would let that happen. If I'm not wrong about that and the Second DCA says I've got to start handing out cell phones from every deceased person that is in my court, I'm in the wrong line of work. I'm not doing that.

So we'll clear that up; you're not going to get all of it. I'll give you that day. I've already said I'll give you that day, though. I'm trying to figure out how to give you that day while protecting everybody's rights.

And we've already had this conversation. But

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Mr. Loughery's already given you that day. You just want that day a different way. You want to look at it yourself. And I already asked him the question about the gun, which I think is actually — you know, I don't have that many great observations in the world, but I think that was a pretty good observation that that's an accurate comparison.

So I'm just trying to figure out how to do this efficiently and protect everybody's rights. That's all I'm doing.

MR. ESCOBAR: Judge, it goes with our constitutional right -- my client's constitutional right to due process. We have the right to confront and to be able to present a zealous and competent defense and that's where the issue is.

And I shouldn't have to, under any stretch of the imagination, accept the Government's expert as the expert that has done it perfectly, that the expert that has done it honestly. That's not what defense attorneys do and thank God we don't do that.

THE COURT: You're trying to convince me of something to believe.

MR. LOUGHERY: Wait a minute. I've already said that I'm -- if it's wrong, I want to make sure

it's right. 1 Yeah. Right. You're trying to 2 THE COURT: 3 convince me of something I already believe. MR. LOUGHERY: Right. 5 THE COURT: Consider it -- take yes. 6 Mr. Grimaldi, add what you need to add before 7 I rule. 8 MR. GRIMALDI: Your Honor, very briefly. 9 know, I agree that this case that Counsel for the 10 Defense keeps saying is a civil case, but the civil 11 case specifically says that what -- on Page 4, 12 first paragraph. If you read that whole paragraph, 13 it specifically indicates --14 THE COURT: Which page? I mean, which case? 15 MR. GRIMALDI: Page 4 of Antico case. 16 Antico. All right. It happens to THE COURT: 17 be the one I'm holding. That's perfect. 18 MR. GRIMALDI: It starts with: "The context 19 of the Respondent's discovery request is quite 20 important." 21 THE COURT: Yes. 22 MR. GRIMALDI: Page 4. 23 Again, this is a civil case with civil 24 procedure, not criminal procedure. 25 specifically outlines that in this case it's not a

fishing expedition because --

THE COURT: I know. I read the case. It's a texting while driving and GPS.

MR. GRIMALDI: It's a cell phone, whether he was texting or not --

So the defense indicated in this case, one side indicated that he was texting, the other side indicated that it was different. So that's the issue. Here, all we have is Mr. Escobar indicating that he says something's wrong. He says something's wrong. Well, I can say it all day, just like I can say maybe he was on his bank account that morning at 8:30 in the morning. Why is that relevant? Maybe he looked at his daughter's medical information at 10:00 that morning. How is that relevant? HIPAA, I think, protects that pretty strongly.

So I wouldn't even suggest that the whole day is relevant.

THE COURT: It's already been given to him.

MR. GRIMALDI: I understand. That's why I can't argue against it. But what I can say is that he is not entitled to more — looking at the phone any more because he has not — while he says I haven't met my burden, he hasn't suggested what the

exact problem is. Without knowing what the problem is, I can't meet my burden because I'm arguing in the dark, arguing in a vacuum. I have no clue what to suggest if he is right or wrong or what I may have a privacy right to.

THE COURT: All right. So what's the flaw if

I write the order as Mr. Escobar proposed, that the
expert may examine under the close observation of
the State's expert -- and I'll even throw it in,
your expert or your person as the executor of the
estate and/or the personal representative of
Mr. Oulson. What's the problem with him doing
that, which the State has already done, limiting it
to that one day, which the State's already done, to
make sure that what they did was correctly done?
What's the problem with that?

MR. LEAL: Your Honor, if I may? Steven Leal on behalf of the Estate and Mrs. Oulson.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. LEAL: We think what's in this particular case that we're citing to, again, is actually a very good roadmap for you to follow for that. And the thing that I would point out here is that in this case, once their expert had a chance to look at the area in question, he did not disclose that

information directly to the respondents in that case. They had to provide what they found to the petitioner first. And the petitioner was afforded an opportunity to review that for a period of time and then make objections based on what was disclosed as to whether or not that was relevant or they had any issues with it. That would allow the State in his capacity and us in our capacity to both have a chance to see what was actually there and if it's something that we would have an objection to.

THE COURT: Yeah. But your two sides —— your side and the State have had this phone for now 18 months knowing that there could be useful information on it. You could have turned it on yesterday; you could have turned it on this morning; you could have turned it on last month; you could have turned it on three months ago and looked at everything that's on the phone and/or you've had your experts available to look at what's on the phone. Well, if you haven't found anything other than what you gave, then that's what you expect is on there. And I don't have any reason to doubt that you found what was on there. I am curious, as I read through this, if there isn't

more like just a simple printout of: First text
message at 1:13, "Hi. How do you think the
Chargers are going to do in the playoff game?" You
know, I mean something — reading this, it's
convoluted. It is kind of tough to read and for me
to understand. I've only had it for an hour under
the intense scrutiny of everything that's going on,
so I haven't had a chance to look at it closely.
But it's not as simple as, first text message — I
mean, I turn my phone on, I can see my history of
text messages that I did. It's pretty easy to
read. This isn't that easy to read.

And I looked at what Mr. Escobar pointed me to, and that's pretty difficult to read in the way it's printed out as well. I don't understand why they shouldn't have the chance to read that which you've had for 16 or 18 months.

So explain to it me again because I want to try to make sure I understand both sides. And I've heard a lot from Mr. Escobar today.

Do you have anything else to explain to me as far as what -- what I need to do to protect your client's rights for that day that's already been handed over. I mean, do you believe that the State missed something? Is that your concern?

MR. LEAL: No, Judge. Our concern is that our 1 client, to the extent that we acquiesced to this 2 3 information being used in the case --THE COURT: Right. MR. LEAL: -- had an understanding that it 5 6 would not extend beyond the scope of the day. 7 THE COURT: Right. 8 MR. LEAL: If we're were to the point we're 9 past that point by all parties and we're agreeing 10 with that, then we're in the realm of getting this 11 resolved. THE COURT: I'm not going past the day. 12 13 not going past the day. 14 MR. LEAL: Okay. Based on what you said 15 earlier, that's fine. 16 THE COURT: Okay. 17 MR. LEAL: And what's already been provided 18 has been provided. What could have been done can't 19 be undone. 20 THE COURT: The horse is out of the barn, to 21 use my old Dade City expression. 22 MR. LEAL: Exactly. 23 But to the extent that the process of trying 24 to take a second stab at this from their end is 25 going to allow access to other information.

THE COURT: It's not. I'm going to direct that Mr. Escobar's expert is going to look only at this day. Everything else is destroyed and not public record, not to leave the room, give it right back to the State. The State can fry it; they can shred it; they can do whatever they want. But I think Mr. Escobar thinks that maybe there are more horses in the barn, to stay with my metaphor, so he wants to go and look and see if there are any other horses.

Mr. Loughery says he's already looked; there's nothing else — or his expert has, there's nothing else, so, you know, it should be pretty simple.

There either is stuff or there isn't stuff. If there is stuff, I don't even know if it's relevant stuff. I don't know. That's the idea, though; they get to look at it. Not everything that comes out in a deposition or discovery is relevant; it's for them to sort through because an allegation is made that could send their client to prison for theoretically the rest of his life or 25 years.

So I've got to let them look at something. So I'm trying to figure out what I can let them look at that still protects your interest, keeps the State able to prosecute their case, and protects

Mr. Reeves's rights.

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MR. LEAL: Which, again, presupposes that there's something that's been missed, there's something that's inaccurate. And if an expert can look at it and come to that conclusion, again, we think the way this case was structured where the other side has a chance to look at it first -because we may be able to look and say, it's the same stuff that was disclosed. There's maybe a date stamp that we didn't have beforehand that shows that it's from that particular date. Maybe there's a date stamp that says it had nothing to do with that date; it's from another date, but for whatever reason because it's listed that particular way in the data collection, it doesn't have a date applied to it, then it isn't relevant.

THE COURT: Well, that's not much of horse to still be in the barn then. It shouldn't be a problem if that's all there is. Right?

MR. LEAL: Right. But if they've got access to it first at that point, without us having the ability to come in and make an objection to you subsequent to it being downloaded, then, again, we're getting into the area where Mr. Loughery suggested where it's discoverable; therefore, it's

information that might get out. And if it is 1 medical information at this point isn't that 2 3 detailed or if it's personal information -- you know, honestly, without knowing what's there, it's a lot of speculation on our part. 5 6 THE COURT: Do you want me to give you 7 another --8 MR. LEAL: So we're having to protect our client's potential interest based on something 9 10 we're speculating. 11 THE COURT: Do you want me to give you another 12 two weeks to look at the phone or another week to 13 look at the phone to make sure that nothing else is 14 in there? 15 MR. GRIMALDI: We never had the phone, Your 16 Honor. 17 THE COURT: Well, your client had the phone 18 before he passed away at the theater. Your client 19 had it or Ms. Oulson had it. 20 MR. GRIMALDI: No. It was taken --21 MR. LEAL: No. It was taken in custody at the 22 scene. 23 THE COURT: No. Before they passed away. 24 When they walked into the theater, either 25 Mr. Oulson or Ms. Oulson had the phone. And --

MR. LEAL: 1 Sure. THE COURT: I mean, would you want me to write 2 3 an order that says that you get to look at phone also? I could do that. State, do you have any objection to them 5 6 looking at the phone? 7 MR. LOUGHERY: No. We would have no problem, 8 we never would, if they wanted to look at it. 9 THE COURT: Okay. 10 MR. LOUGHERY: I don't know if it needs to be 11 powered up or whatever. But --12 THE COURT: It's in an evidence locker. 13 been there for 18 months. 14 MR. LOUGHERY: But, see -- okay. And that's 15 fine, except for, I would imagine, Mr. Escobar 16 would suggest that he might have a problem with 17 that because what if somebody deletes something. 18 mean, I don't know. We've been trying to not do 19 that for obvious reasons. 20 THE COURT: Okay. Right. It's in evidence. 21 MR. LOUGHERY: And if 22 Ms. Oulson just said, "Hey. Can I borrow the phone 23 for a few minutes", we would have said no. 24 THE COURT: Well, no. Yeah. Obviously chain 25 of custody's got to be protected by you, the same

way against Ms. Oulson tampering with it that in case, for some reason one of Mr. Escobar's experts wanted to tamper with it.

Nobody gets to see the phone without there being an evidence custodian there. But I don't see how I say no to them. If it was a gun, I'd let them look at it.

MR. LOUGHERY: Sure.

THE COURT: And since it's already out and I can't put these horses back in, it doesn't -- it doesn't change anything.

So I'm going to write an order letting your expert look at it. I'm going to give you the ability to download what you need to download, look at one day, destroy everything else.

Basically I'm going to write the order essentially the way you just proposed it, with the understanding that I'll delay it seven days if you want. Do you want seven days so that you, in the company, of course, of an evidence custodian can go look at it first?

MR. GRIMALDI: Your Honor, we, coincidentally, have Nicole Oulson's deposition on Monday the 15th as it stands right now. So that would be a perfect time for us to be able to do that within the time

1 period --THE COURT: All right. 2 3 MR. GRIMALDI: -- if that's what you're going 4 to write in the order. That would give us the 5 opportunity to all be in one spot anyway to look at 6 it, take care of it, and be done with it. 7 THE COURT: Okay. 8 MR. GRIMALDI: If you're going to write that 9 in the order. 10 THE COURT: All right. So you want me to let 11 their expert look at it on June 15? 12 MR. GRIMALDI: No. Let us look at it, as you 13 were suggesting just now. 14 THE COURT: On June 15? 15 MR. GRIMALDI: Yes. Which is Monday. 16 THE COURT: But do you need Ms. Oulson to be 17 present for this, to surf through this phone? 18 MR. GRIMALDI: You were going to -- my point 19 is is that we were going to -- never mind. 20 THE COURT: Well, I'm just trying to figure 21 out --22 MR. GRIMALDI: You said you were going to give 23 us seven days to look at it. 24 THE COURT: Yeah. 25 MR. GRIMALDI: What I was suggesting is we can take care of that even faster coming in Monday is my point.

THE COURT: Oh, okay. You want to do it on Monday. Okay.

Mr. Escobar, do you have any problem with me letting Ms. Oulson look at phone before you all look at it?

MR. ESCOBAR: Your Honor, as long as their expert is present during that process, just to make sure that nothing happens. I'm talking about their expert, not my expert.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. ESCOBAR: Their expert. As long as there's someone responsible that knows how to handle that phone in order to take a look at it and not delete information, I have no problems with that.

You know, one of the things that I'm going to suggest and that maybe Mr. Loughery can confirm, this problem of deleting or destroying or what have you, can be easily fixed if the Government properly downloads, maybe, again, the entire phone, holds that hard drive separate and apart. Because that's what we're going to propose anyway for part two of my motion.

Part two of my motion is, obviously, that I want to have physical use of the phone. And I'm proposing that you download all of the information from the phone, preserve it, make sure that it's preserved, and then clean that phone as far as information that's been downloaded onto that phone with the exception of the main screen on the phone.

THE COURT: All right. Before we get to that -- before we get to that, stop for just one second.

MR. ESCOBAR: Okay.

THE COURT: I want to put the first issue to bed.

MR. ESCOBAR: Okay.

THE COURT: And so here's what I'm going to do: I'm going to direct, Mr. Escobar, you provide me with an order by -- can you get it done by, say, next Wednesday or -- no, next Friday -- when's your expert coming to town? Is he coming to town to do this or is he here?

MR. ESCOBAR: Judge, he is. But I'll have to schedule that with him. I didn't want to get the cart before the horse.

THE COURT: All right. So what we'll do is -- could you run it by -- the order that you propose,

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could you run it with your language by Mr. Loughery, let's say, by -- you're going to see him Monday anyway for the deposition, right? run it by him on Monday. And then, Mr. Loughery, you'll get a chance to provide me with a competing order, if you don't like the language or you can't come to an agreement on the tweaking, but you know basically what I'm approving here, that I'm going to let his expert look at it over your objection, preserved for the record, not going to tamper with it, only going to download the one day. We'll download the whole thing, destroy everything else. Keep the one day, print it and you're good. And it's what you already gave him anyway, so he's not getting anything extra, unless there's, like I said, the mysterious horses that didn't emerge from the barn and aren't already gone. And --

MR. LOUGHERY: Well, let me ask this -- I understand. Do I get those horses or do I have to wait?

THE COURT: You absolutely would get those horses.

MR. LOUGHERY: That day.

THE COURT: Well, I don't think you're going to get them that day because I don't think you'll

1 have found them. They don't know if there's horses that day. Right? Will he? 2 3 MR. LOUGHERY: I don't know. I'm not --THE COURT: I don't know. I don't know how this --MR. LOUGHERY: 5 6 MR. ESCOBAR: Well, my expert --7 THE COURT: I'm going to be writing an order this week that's going to set out a discovery 8 9 timeline for the Defense. So you better get 10 discovery ready because it's time. It's time. 11 It's 18 months. It's time. 12 So you're going to be getting a lot of things 13 very soon. Because before the June 30th date 14 arrives, I'm going to write a long order setting 15 out the things that I expect to see happen between 16 now and the end of July. 17 MR. LOUGHERY: Okay. But here's my specific 18 problem about whatever he takes away --19 THE COURT: Right. 20 MR. LOUGHERY: -- from there --21 THE COURT: Yes. MR. LOUGHERY: -- in his software --22 23 THE COURT: Yes. 24 MR. LOUGHERY: Okay? -- if I don't have or we 25 don't have that on that day --

THE COURT: Right. 1 MR. LOUGHERY: Okay? -- then they have an 2 3 opportunity, if they follow the Rules of Discovery, they don't have to give me everything. They can 5 pick and choose what they want to give back, if 6 it's different than what I have. 7 THE COURT: I understand your concern. 8 MR. LOUGHERY: Okay. 9 THE COURT: And your concern is met by my 10 order. Because your expert will be standing there 11 watching what happens. And if they run the --12 MR. LOUGHERY: I got you. 13 THE COURT: -- TSX 15 37 software, then your expert could then wait until Mr. Escobar's expert 14 15 leaves, and then he could run the TSX 37 software 16 and get the exact same results and see the exact 17 same horses that may still be in the barn. 18 right? 19 MR. LOUGHERY: I got you. Yes, sir. 20 THE COURT: All right. So we have a plan on 21 that. 22 You tell me there's a second issue. Tell me 23 your second issue. 24 MR. ESCOBAR: Your Honor, as the Court knows,

this was a continuation of our motion to compel

that we did a couple of weeks ago --

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. ESCOBAR: -- and this involves a very similar issues.

What I am proposing on the phone is that once we go ahead and get this download done and I get January the 13th, --

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. ESCOBAR: — what I am proposing is that, again, we need to have the actual phone that was Mr. Oulson's phone on this particular day for us to use in our analysis of events that occurred there at the theater. And the way to do that so they're not concerned that somehow I'm going to get this phone now and get, you know, some area of downloading that I wasn't entitled to is that, you know, they can download it, preserve it, and then clean the phone of any of those downloads that we had previously obtained and just give me the phone — okay? — with, you know — that has not been altered as far as the lighting —

THE COURT: Right.

MR. ESCOBAR: -- on the screen; that has not been altered in any of the settings. And I can use that phone for a period of three or four days with

my experts and myself in our analysis of trying to determine what actually happened in the theater.

THE COURT: Is it an iPhone 5?

MR. ESCOBAR: It's a 5.

THE COURT: Does it have any little letters behind it or is it just the iPhone 5?

MR. ESCOBAR: Your Honor, I've got the serial number back at the office. I didn't bring that.

It may be in my motion.

THE COURT: I mean, I don't need the serial, it's just -- I just looked up iPhone 5 on Amazon. I Bing'd it on Amazon. It says that there's plenty of these available. I bet you that they're fairly standard.

MR. ESCOBAR: Yeah. But that's the problem,
Your Honor. I don't want to get into issues —
expert issues as to whether the light that's
emanating from the screen of this particular phone
on a phone that was maybe manufactured in January
may be a little different than a phone that was
manufactured in April or so and on and so on.
We've got the light setting that presumably hasn't
been altered. And I have total confidence the
Government didn't do anything or their experts to
alter the light setting on the phone or any of the

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settings on the phone. This will give us -- I'm sure they've documented those settings as well before they've done anything to this phone. it's an opportunity for me to get just that phone and get that particular phone that was used, power it up, and use it for our experiments and our testing and then provide that within a five-day period back to the Government. It's as simple as that. And then we're not getting into the issue of whether, you know, that particular phone had, you know a lower ambient light or a higher ambient light or whatever the issues may be. It creates, I think, a very solid basis for expert opinion later down the road. If not, you know, we're going to have these particular problems. They're going to be objecting, well, it wasn't the phone. They got, you know, a phone that was manufactured on a different month. And there's no need for it. There's no prejudice on their part. I'm waiving -just like I told you the last time in the motion, I'm waiving chain of custody for all the items that we requested. There's no chain of custody issue here. And that's been his response, oh, chain of I'm responsible for chain of custody. As I told you at the last hearing, we're waiving chain

1 of custody. We don't care about chain of custody. None of the items that we are asking for really has 2 3 a chain of custody issue. They're very identifiable items and I think we discussed that with the Court. Items that have really 5 6 identifiable serial numbers and what have you are 7 items that really chain of custody means very 8 little and, so, we're willing to waive that. 9 give us that item. Let us take it; let us use it. 10 We'll give it right back to you. And then both the 11 State and the Defense has equal access to do their 12 test. Equal access. It's due process. 13 right to confront his theory of prosecution. 14 THE COURT: All right. How many days do you 15 want the phone for? 16 I'll take it for five days. MR. ESCOBAR: 17 THE COURT: Okay. Is this your shoe time 18 right now? Do you have the left shoe right now? 19 I haven't gotten the left shoe MR. ESCOBAR: 20 yet because I'm going to bring my experts down and 21 try to do it altogether. 22 THE COURT: Okay. Okay. State, I'm going to 23 go out on a limb here and guess that you object to 24 them having five days alone with the phone.

I do. And I think there's a

MR. LOUGHERY:

valid reason. One is they can get another phone as you suggested. We're thinking that way. But the real issue that he doesn't seem to understand about waiving the chain of custody, first off, we can't make them stipulate to that. But, secondarily, if their expert makes a finding where it's not — our evidence is not being supervised — okay? — I found that the light was X, Y, Z. And our expert says, well, I find the light the was A, B, C.

Okay. Now you have an absolute credibility issue in front of a jury that doesn't need to exist if the expert is supervised where they both see it happen at the same time.

There's absolutely no purpose -- again, I don't know what they -- they want to take her phone and throw it on the ground to see if it lights up. Is that going to alter or damage it? It might. Okay? If Ms. Oulson decides, hey, when this trial is over, I want a momento of my husband; I want to put his cell phone on my mantelpiece, I mean, I don't know. It's not theirs to have for five days, to throw it on the ground -- okay? -- or do whatever they need to do. If it's just trying to figure out if the light comes on when it strikes something or if somebody steps on it and the light

comes on, even though it's in a protective sleeve, well, their expert can do it in front of ours. There's no need to have it in some top secret lab on the moon for five days so they can run all these tests. I mean, enough's enough. It's an item in evidence. It can easily be duplicated by buying another one. If they come up with some huge issue, then we can deal with it at that point. But just to give them the phone to go out the door — and then also as part have that, we've had to download it and clean it and done all those type of things which is time—consuming and unnecessary.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I'm not worried about the time-consuming part, but I am concerned about some of the other aspects.

Mr. Escobar, I'm still trying to figure out why it's got to be this phone. If you said you can find out what the settings are, and those will be preserved. If you said that it's readily identifiable and it's actually not that unique. Henry Ford did us a great favor by standardizing production of all of this stuff. And I think Apple's taken it the next step. I mean, you can take a SIM card out of most of these phones and pop it in the next and they're going to work just fine.

Why is it that your expert can't, for whatever simulation you plan to do, why can't they just buy the exact same phone? I mean, you can — literally there are tens of thousands of phones, Apple 5s, that are available. It's not the most modern. I think we're at 6 or something now. But there are tens of thousands of these phones. You can get it the same month the same plant. You can get — you know, you can get it made on Monday and it can all be determined.

MR. ESCOBAR: Because I can't guarantee that the same ambient light, the same amount of light is emanating from the LCD screen that is on the front of the phone, which is of crucial importance. And when you're looking at those particular issues, that is a crucial issue for us. Because, remember, part of their theory is that somehow a stripe on a shoe, okay, is what caused the ambient light. And we have the right to confront that. We have the right to confront that with the actual phone, not some other phone that they're going to say, well, you know, they bought that, you know, two years later or, you know, that phone's a used phone from, you know, from someone else, whatever the issue may be. As we know, when these phones are

manufactured, Apple may in January be manufacturing 1 2 a particular phone and then by March, that bug or 3 that issue has been corrected and improved. virtually impossible, Your Honor, for us to 5 quarantee that same ambient lighting. And when you 6 consider and weigh the issues here of fairness, 7 it's rather clear that we've provided everything 8 that we can to them to make it as fair as possible 9 so that, you know, whatever privacy issues are not 10 infringed and all we want is for five days so that 11 we can do our own testing in order to be able to 12 confront our particular issues that the Government 13 has placed before us. They don't get the right --14 did they call us and say, hey, listen. Come on 15 over and, you know, my expert's going to be, you 16 know, opening the phone and testing the light and 17 doing the shoes and all. They didn't call us over 18 for that. And for some reason they think that just 19 because it's a Defense expert that they're 20 untrustworthy or they're not reliable, --21 I don't think he said that. THE COURT: 22 MR. ESCOBAR: -- which is, I think, a bit 23 farfetched. 24

THE COURT: I don't think he's saying that. I don't think he's saying that. You both -- you

obviously both have very different jobs. You're both very good at your jobs. You know that your jobs are different. You know that he's on offense. He's got to prove his case. The burden of proof rests exclusively at the People of the State of Florida. It's a different — it's a different scenario that he's running. That's why he's the keeper of the evidence. I gave you a shoe. That's one thing. There were two of them. But now we're talking about the phone and I don't know what tests you're going to run on it. And —

MR. ESCOBAR: Your Honor, I can tell you, we're going to determine what the settings were and hopefully --

THE COURT: Okay. Why can't you do that with them there?

MR. ESCOBAR: We can do the settings, obviously. We can tell what the settings are. But we want to be able to use that particular phone and the ambient light that comes from that particular phone in a scene in the theater that's going to help us understand what happened that day. And, no, it's not as easy as just going and buying a iPhone 5 and saying, well, you know, let's assume -- let's assume that that's the same ambient

light or let's -- you know, let's just assume that Apple didn't change the ambient light or that this phone, you know, didn't have a greater ambient light just because of the way it was produced. That is way too dangerous in our line of work, especially when we're dealing with someone's life. What they're putting on the other side is total speculation that somehow we're either going to crush the phone on the phone floor or we're going to lose the phone. That's speculative. What we're asking this Court and what we're telling this Court that we're doing has no speculation whatsoever.

We've got — and if you want to put us under court orders — as I told this Court before, if you want to put us under court orders that I am to, you know, be present with that phone at all times, that's exactly what I'll do in order to give this Court and the prosecution some assurance that nothing is going to happen to that phone.

I think we're entitled. We're entitled to test it. But we're not necessarily just entitled to test it, you know, at the wishes of the Government and how the Government wants when they have nothing concrete to back that up. It's just total speculation.

THE COURT: All right. Here's what we're going to do: Your motion is denied without prejudice.

Have your expert go look at the phone. him check the settings. Have him check the serial He doesn't have to use Bing; search engine of his choice. If he can't find the phone on the Internet and get the exact lot number so that he's confident that he can render an expert opinion based on his examination of the one phone and then the almost identical -- and when I say, "almost identical", I mean, these things weigh out to the microgram the same. I mean, they go to great lengths, probably someplace in China, to make these phones exactly the same. So if he comes in and he tells me after the examination of the State's phone and his cursory search of the Internet to try and find another phone exactly like it. We'll set it at the same setting and conduct his -- I don't want to call it an experiment because I don't want to --I'm not attempting to denigrate what you're doing. I get what you're trying to do. I understand it and I admire the enthusiasm that you put into it. But at the same time, it would be an exceptional -an exceptional change in the current status of the

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law for me to give you the phone. You can't give me a case where somebody said, here, key pieces of evidence, the only key piece of evidence, take it. You know, when there's bullets, if there's ten them, I don't have a problem giving you two or five even. When there's shoes and there are two, I gave you one, which I thought was pretty exceptional. I'm bending over backwards to accommodate you. But now we're talking about the only phone where a replica that Apple takes such great care to make the same, with the same settings, the same numbers is out there.

So have your expert look at it.

MR. ESCOBAR: I will, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Have him do whatever he's going to do with it. And if that doesn't work and then he can come in under oath and tell me, Judge, I'm an expert. Here's my bona fides; here's my CV. Give Mr. Loughery a chance, if he's still here to cross-examine on it and see where we are. Okay? So ...

MR. ESCOBAR: Judge, I will definitely do that.

The only thing I would ask the Court, not that I would think the State would do anything to change

the settings, but I would ask the Court to issue an order that when they're reviewing the phone, including the State and Mr. Grimaldi, that none of the settings on the phone be disturbed and be preserved for my expert to view.

THE COURT: And I will -- you know, State, you

THE COURT: And I will -- you know, State, you understand what he's saying?

MR. LOUGHERY: Of course, Judge.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. I mean, it's a given. He knows it's not supposed to happen. He's going to let it happen. At some point, we'll have to trust each other a little bit. So let's do that.

Were there any other issues I can attempt to resolve today to advance the case to trial?

MR. ESCOBAR: Judge, we're trying. I think
Mr. Loughery will tell you, we're trying as much as
possible to get as many depos done. You know, we
had a bump in the road with an expert in that --

THE COURT: Uh-oh.

MR. ESCOBAR: You know, it is a doctor. And it's one of the — they're just difficult. So, they hired a lawyer and, so, we had some changes that we had to make, but we're moving forward. We're trying to take as many depos as possible.

Dino and I are in depos this month. I can't tell 1 you how many depos. 2 3 THE COURT: I understand. All right. Mr. Loughery, is there anything I can do to 5 advance the case from the position of the 6 prosecution? 7 MR. LOUGHERY: I don't think so, Judge. Ι 8 think we know what our --9 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Grimaldi, anything 10 you want to add? 11 MR. GRIMALDI: No, Your Honor. Because I 12 think you're denial without prejudice is sufficient 13 because we can readdress my potential issue if it 14 comes up. 15 THE COURT: You had an issue on the physical 16 phone issue? 17 MR. GRIMALDI: Yes. 18 THE COURT: All right. We'll save it and see 19 if we need to cross it. We'll see if we even need 20 to cross that bridge. 21 MR. GRIMALDI: I think given your order we can 22 save it. 23 THE COURT: All right. And the deposition of 24 the victim is going to occur on Monday; is that 25 what I heard?

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MR. GRIMALDI: Yes, sir.
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              THE COURT: Okay. My ears perked up. That's
 2
         good to hear. It means we're moving closer. Good.
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              Good luck, everybody.
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              We're in recess on that.
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     (Proceedings concluded.)
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STATE	OF	FLORIDA)
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COUNTY	OE	PASCO)

I, Victoria L. Campbell, Registered

Professional Reporter, certify that I was authorized to and did stenographically report the foregoing proceedings and that the transcript is a true record.

DATED this 19th day of September, 2016

